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It is a commonplace that Galileo inaugurated the mathematization
of physical science when claiming the universe to be a book written
in the language of mathematics. Less commonplace, but well-known
all the same, is the mathematization of natural philosophy by
Bradwardine and other fourteenth-century philosophers.
The insightful contributions to the present volume go beyond these
traditional understandings, as its notion of the ‘real world’ goes
(somewhat) beyond the limits of natural philosophy. All concentrate
on particular questions and actors.
Three contributions deal with discussions around the continuum.
Aurélien Robert treats of ‘atomism and geometry in fourteenth-century
Oxford’, concentrating on the atomists Catton, Crathorn and Wyclif
and their arguments. He observes that their finitist arguments are
often geometrically wrong (namely, one may add, because they cannot
avoid presupposing aspects of Euclidean geometry and thus the
continuum); however, since their interest was the world of existing
things – and, behind that, theology, with a long-standing interest also
in the continuity or discreteness of qualities such as charity, and,
according to the atomists in question, its teaching that only God, not
his creation could be infinite – this was no decisive problem:
mathematics could be argued not to describe existing things. The
article offers a thorough analysis of the often sophisticated arguments
of the three authors.
Sabine Rommevaux deals with Bradwardine’s De continuo, of which
she produced a partial translation in 2005. Here, she discusses whether
the treatise is justly seen as a primarily mathematical investigation
of the continuum (John Murdoch’s position) or as a treatise dealing
fundamentally with natural philosophy, with a hidden layer of
theology (Edith Sylla’s reading). Since Bradwardine does not take up
those arguments of his opponents which touch on theology,
Rommevaux dismisses the theological layer. Further, as Bradwardine
is shown by close analysis of his argument to take as his basic premise
that all continua (physical as well as mathematical) are similar,
Rommevaux concludes that Bradwardine combines physical and
geometrical arguments, while pointing out that his purpose – to refute
the finitist arguments of Grosseteste, Harclay and Chatton – puts
physics in the privileged position.
Stephen Clucas investigates Thomas Harriot’s atomism, in
particular the belief that it is borrowed from Giordano Bruno. This
belief, held by Hilary Gatti and others, is argued (convincingly, in
the reviewer’s opinion) not to hold water. One argument in favour
of influence was a passage in a manuscript, shown however by John
Henry already in 1982 to be misread (Clucas has now identified the
real reference of the passage). Others build on supposed similarity
between Harriot’s and Bruno’s texts; but the similarities are always
generic and better explained by the common background of both –
Harriot was indeed an interested reader of medieval philosophical
manuscripts. In conclusion, Harriot’s atomism appear to derive from
his mathematical studies, whose consequences were carried over to
his physical views.
Two contributions deal with (fourteenth-century) musical theory.
Dorit Tanay ‘studies the relations between Jean de Murs’ revolutionary
musical theory and contemporary mathematical works belonging to
the calculators’ tradition of Merton College’. Jean’s theory deals with
rhythm, not with harmonics, and the ‘quantification of qualities’
provides the link to the calculators. Quantification, as Tanay
emphasizes, was not an idiosyncratic Merton interest, and since Jean
wrote his Notitia artis musicae in 1321, Merton influence is indeed not
plausible (Bradwardine’s Tractatus de proportionibus is from 1328);
Tanay suggests parallel developments on a common background,
mentioning Gerard of Brussels’ De motu and Archimedes’ De mensura
circuli. The relevance of the quantification of qualities (unexpected
both from the perspective of later notations and, say, Augustine’s De
musica) is that interaction with Aristotelian metaphysics had caused
the length of a note to be understood as a quality: depending on
circumstances a longa note, like any Aristotelian nature, might be
perfect (three time units) or imperfect (two units), and so might a
brevis (one respectively two units); finally, a semibrevis might be 2/3
or 1/3. So, the rhythmic possibilities were very restricted, and more
so because the actual length of notes was not determined freely by
the composer (a longa followed by a brevis had to be imperfect, etc.).
Jean did not give up the idea that length was a quality, and did not
get rid of ambiguity in the naming of lengths; but by quantifying this
quality he allowed the production of a much wider range of rhythmic
patterns – according to Tanay before these had come to be used in
musical practice.
Matthieu Husson’s paper on Jean de Boen’s Ars and De musica
(1350s) takes up the traditional core topic of musical theory:
harmonics. De Boen’s innovations with respect to the Pythagorean-
Boëthian tradition were based on a sensualist approach to dissonance
and consonance, according to which harmony is determined by what
turns out to be pleasant to the ear, and further on his notions of
consonance per se (the octave and the quint, perfect, and the third and
the sixth, imperfect) and consonance per accidens, that is, harmony
achieved through the ‘accidental’ vicinity of a consonance per se. This
division and widening of the realm of consonance was apparently
taken over from Jerome of Moravia, so what is really new in de Boen
was his use of arguments derived from natural philosophy for what
was consonant (e.g., optical imagery, and considerations regarding
the movement of air). In this way, as argued by Husson, de Boen
contributed to transferring musical theory from the quadrivium (that
is, Boëthian non-demonstrative mathematics) to the domain of
‘intermediate sciences’, dependent on demonstrative mathematics as
well as natural philosophy.
Three contributions deal with mechanics and architecture. Walter
Roy Laird takes up Blasius of Parma’s Questiones super tractatum de
ponderibus and Tractatus de ponderibus. As he quotes earlier discussions,
these treatises have been judged, from Pierre Duhem to Marshall
Clagett and Joseph Brown, to be at best an unoriginal repetition of
what had been done by Jordanus and his followers in the thirteenth
century, at worst (Brown) ‘a thoroughly Aristotelian exercise with a
decided preference for the paradoxical over the rigorous’. Laird admits
that these characterizations seem adequate if the treatises are read
simply as steps toward later statics, but then concludes reasonably
that better understanding of Blasius’s intention may change them. He
suggests that in the Questiones ‘Blasius was concerned not so much
with advancing the science of weights as with examining the
foundations in the light of fourteenth-century natural philosophy’,
and finds one of the ‘main purposes [of the Tractatus to be] to suggest
a way around what he saw as the failure of the science of weights
to take into account the buoyancy and resistance of the medium’.
These claims are vindicated through analysis of Blasius’s treatises in
relation to the thirteenth-century founding works – the Liber de canonio,
the Liber Archimedis de insidentibus in humidum, and the various
treatises written by or attributed to Jordanus – as well as the
fourteenth-century Aliud commentum. It is concluded that ‘in the light
of the later attempts by Benedetti and Galileo to establish an
Archimedean science of falling bodies through buoyant and resistant
media, the scholastic mechanics of Blasius of Parma does not seem
so backward’.
Sophie Roux deals with the way Galileo, his predecessors
(Leonardo, Guidobaldo del Monte, Baldi) and Torricelli approached
the problem of percussion – the hammering of nails into wood, of
sheet piles into the ground, etc. Even today, the reviewer remembers
from having taught building engineers’ physics, such problems can
only be treated semi-empirically, by means of an adaptable model
for the behaviour of the receiving medium; at a moment when the
preferred mathematical tool was proportion theory, even Descartes’
rule v(m1+m2) = v1m1+v2m2 could not be expressed. The usual approach
(not that of Leonardo, who proposed semi-empirical methods) was
to think in terms of the simple machines of Hero, Pappus and the
(ps.-)Aristotelian Mechanics (and thus ultimately of the lever) and to
ascribe (in the paradigmatic case of vertical percussion) to the falling
body an extra ‘acquired weight’, whose ratio to the ‘natural weight’
was to be found. This (with more explicit reference to the machine
model) was also Galileo’s approach in Le mechaniche, which however
only leads to a promise to elucidate the matter in another treatise that
never saw the light. In the ‘Sixth day’ intended to be added to the
Discorsi, an ingenious real experiment, together with a thought
experiment, lead Galileo to conclude that the force of percussion is
‘infinite, or rather indeterminate and indeterminable’ and thus not
reducible to an equivalent weight (an unpublished experiment related
by Torricelli confirms the conclusion very directly). He then tries an
analogy with the infinitely repeated ‘impression of force’ in a free fall,
which merely leads him to the problem (which he tries to explain
away) that the actual effect of a percussion does not seem to be
infinite. Torricelli, when taking up the idea in a series of lectures for
the literary Accademia della Crusca, tries a solution which contradicts
Galileo’s fundamental insight in the law of free fall (a contradiction
he may not have noticed). He saves himself with an unsubstantiated
reference to Cavalieri; as observed by Roux, mathematics has taken
over from physics and rhetoric from mathematics.
Samuel Gessner’s concluding paper approaches the relation
between architecture and mathematics through Daniele Barbaro’s
commentary (1556/67) to Vitruvius, which proclaims the importance
of mathematics for architecture as the criterion determining its being
‘scientific’ and ‘liberal’. Gessner examines whether the amount of
mathematics really used in the core part of the commentary (that is,
leaving aside hydraulics, gnomonics and machines, also dealt with
by Vitruvius, and concentrating on building) really justifies this claim,
and finds very little: in only two passages of book III are mathematical
arguments applied to architectonic questions by Barbaro: a discussion
of the just proportions of the eustylos colonnade, which serves as a
pretext to introduce the Boëthian names for ratios and other pieces
of elementary proportion theory, which however do not serve much
in the unconvincing discussion (nor elsewhere in the commentary);
and when he ‘saves the letters’ of Vitruvius opaque explanation of
how to make the dimension sketch for the volute of a columnar
capital – that is, to interpret Vitruvius’s words as referring to a
geometric construction that justifies Palladio’s way to make this sketch.
In both cases, as summarized by Gessner, mathematics is not applied
to building practice but to the theory of architecture. Asking in the
end whether the references to the importance of mathematics are mere
commonplaces corresponding to what certain readers would expect
from the genre, Gessner proposes as an alternative that Barbaro’s view
of the role of mathematics in architecture might be more sincere, but
the commentary genre not apt to bring this view to fruition.
All essays are thoroughly argued from primary texts. They do not
produce a unified picture, but apart from the interest each one offers
by itself, the totality is a useful reminder that ‘mathematics and
understanding of the real world’ is a question with more facets than
the mathematization of this understanding.
Jens Høyrup
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